%0 Journal Article
%A Junfeng Hu
%A Qingyou Yan
%A Xingmei Li
%A Zhong-Zhong Jiang
%A Fredrich Kahrl
%A Jiang Lin
%A Peng Wang
%B Utilities Policy
%D 2019
%G eng
%P 120 - 127
%R 10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.008
%T A cooperative game-based mechanism for allocating ancillary service costs associated with wind power integration in China
%V 58
%8 06/2019
%! Utilities Policy
%X <p>Wind power in China is developing rapidly. However, wind power curtailment has become increasingly severe, reaching 15% in 2015. The root cause of wind power curtailment in China is that its power system has insufficient flexibility. We analyze how to achieve a reasonable allocation of ancillary service costs for wind power plants, using a cooperative game approach. The analysis shows that, while the current allocation approach in the Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan power grid is based only on wind feed-in tariffs, an allocation method based on both the feed-in tariff and the capacity credit of wind would be more reasonable.</p>