Wind power in China is developing rapidly. However, wind power curtailment has become increasingly severe, reaching 15% in 2015. The root cause of wind power curtailment in China is that its power system has insufficient flexibility. We analyze how to achieve a reasonable allocation of ancillary service costs for wind power plants, using a cooperative game approach. The analysis shows that, while the current allocation approach in the Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan power grid is based only on wind feed-in tariffs, an allocation method based on both the feed-in tariff and the capacity credit of wind would be more reasonable.
BT - Utilities Policy DA - 06/2019 DO - 10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.008 LA - eng N2 -Wind power in China is developing rapidly. However, wind power curtailment has become increasingly severe, reaching 15% in 2015. The root cause of wind power curtailment in China is that its power system has insufficient flexibility. We analyze how to achieve a reasonable allocation of ancillary service costs for wind power plants, using a cooperative game approach. The analysis shows that, while the current allocation approach in the Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan power grid is based only on wind feed-in tariffs, an allocation method based on both the feed-in tariff and the capacity credit of wind would be more reasonable.
PY - 2019 SP - 120 EP - 127 ST - Utilities Policy T2 - Utilities Policy TI - A cooperative game-based mechanism for allocating ancillary service costs associated with wind power integration in China VL - 58 SN - 09571787 ER -