TY - CONF
KW - Energy Markets and Policy Department
KW - Power system reliability
KW - Transmission system reliability publications
KW - Ancillary services
KW - Market mechanisms
KW - Reliability and markets
KW - Reliability management
AU - Afzal S Siddiqui
AU - Chris Marnay
AU - Mark Khavkin
AB - <p>Typically, in competitive electricity markets, the vertically integrated utilities that were responsible for ensuring system reliability in their own service territories, or groups of territories, cease to exist. The burden falls to an independent system operator (ISO) to ensure that enough ancillary services (AS) are available for safe, stable, and reliable operation of the grid, typically defined, in part, as compliance with officially approved engineering specifications for minimum levels of AS. In order to characterize the behavior of market participants (generators, retailers, and an ISO) in a competitive electricity market with reliability requirements, spot markets for both electricity and AS are modeled. By assuming that each participant seeks to maximize its wealth and that all markets clear, we solve for the optimal quantities of electricity and AS traded in the spot market by all participants, as well as the market clearing prices for each.</p>
BT - Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
CY - Berkeley
DA - 01/2001
DO - 10.1109/HICSS.2001.926290
N2 - <p>Typically, in competitive electricity markets, the vertically integrated utilities that were responsible for ensuring system reliability in their own service territories, or groups of territories, cease to exist. The burden falls to an independent system operator (ISO) to ensure that enough ancillary services (AS) are available for safe, stable, and reliable operation of the grid, typically defined, in part, as compliance with officially approved engineering specifications for minimum levels of AS. In order to characterize the behavior of market participants (generators, retailers, and an ISO) in a competitive electricity market with reliability requirements, spot markets for both electricity and AS are modeled. By assuming that each participant seeks to maximize its wealth and that all markets clear, we solve for the optimal quantities of electricity and AS traded in the spot market by all participants, as well as the market clearing prices for each.</p>
PP - Berkeley
PY - 2001
EP - 10
T2 - Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
T3 - Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
TI - Spot Pricing of Electricity and Ancillary Services in a Competitive California Market
ER -